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IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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RADU DUDĂU* 
 
 
 
The neoutilitarian framework 
 
According to the realist theory of world politics, the sovereign state is the 
basic actor on the international stage. There are several reasons adduced in 
support of this assumption. First, sovereign states are not subordinate to any 
overarching authority; thus, the international environment is anarchic. Second, 
the action of non-state actors (nongovernmental organizations, churches, 
multinational corporations, international political parties, etc.) ultimately 
depends on the stability and political authority of the sovereign state. Realists 
also assume that conflicts of interests among states are inevitable, as states 
typically compete for the same scant resources. The fundamental interest of 
states is, from a realist perspective, the national survival in the inherently hostile 
environment of international anarchy. Power is the most important means to 
ensure survival, and there is no constraint upon the ways statesmen are to use 
power other than their judgment and the responsibility they have in furthering 
national survival.
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On the other hand, post-World War I idealists and their contemporary 
followers, neoliberals, are optimistic about the possibility of achieving 
cooperation under international anarchy. They emphasize the prospects for 
peace and prosperity that can emerge from the workings of international 
organizations and other major types of non-state actors. In particular, they 
underscore the importance of spreading democracy, education, liberal trade, 
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arms control and human rights, and denounce “the cynical calculus of pure 
power politics”, as Bill Clinton put it, as a way of conducting world politics. 
Nonetheless, what realism (and its modern version, neorealism) and 
neoliberalism have in common is a rational decision-making framework of 
political deliberation, in which statesmen perform utility calculi meant to 
maximize the interests of their states on the world scene, on the assumption of 
given ordered sets of preferences. Thus, there is a remarkable convergence of 
the approaches to international relations theory, and a fruitful standardization of 
their methodological tools. As John Ruggie summarizes, 
  
Both take the existence of international anarchy for granted, though they may 
differ as to its precise causal force. Both stipulate that states are the primary actors in 
international politics. Both stipulate further that the identities and interests if states are 
given, a priory and exogenously – that is to say, external to and unexplained within the 
terms of their theories. On that basis, both assume that states are rational actors 
maximizing their own expected utilities, defined in such material terms as power, 
security, and welfare. (Ruggie 1998: 9) 
 
Indeed, the disagreements between neorealism and neoliberalism 
basically reduce to underlining different aspects of structural anarchy, that is to 
say, competition and cooperation, respectively. This is not to deny the 
significant consequences of this difference, yet their methodological similarity 
justified Ruggie to coin the term neoutilitarianism to refer to both neorealism 
and neoliberalism. Also, this is not to ignore other important differences 
between the neorealist and neoliberal theories. Here are some more of them: 
while neoliberals insist of the importance of the absolute gains that international 
actors make through mutually advantageous arrangements, neorealists are 
interested in the relative gains, as systematic differences in gains can be 
converted in threatening military power (Grieco 1988). Then, while both 
neorealists and neoliberals agree that both security and prosperity are important 
components of national interests, they emphasize these aspects very differently. 
Finally, the distribution of capabilities is of uppermost importance for 
neorealists (Waltz 1979), whereas neoliberals tend to insist on the intentions, 
interests, and information of international actors.  
 Nonetheless, it is on the neoutilitarian commonalities that I shall focus 
below. Both neorealism and neoliberalism take the self, i.e. the identity of the 
state actor, as exogenously given, that is, to be formed prior to and 
independently of the computing framework of the statesman, fundamentally 
stable and, for that matter, definitional for the preferences and interests of the 
state actor. But, the question poses itself, what does the self stand for when 
talking about self-interested states pursuing self-help strategies? There is a 
strong representation of the empiricist camp in the political philosophy of the 
state, according to which the state is, ontologically speaking, a mere useful 
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fiction or metaphor. It just allows us, by presuming its autonomous agency, to 
readily explain and anticipate international politics. For example, Stephen 
Krasner (1999: 7) considers that  
 
the ontological givens are rulers, specific policy makers, usually but not always 
the executive head of state. Rulers, not states – and not the international system – make 
choices about policies, rules, and institutions. (Krasner 1999: 7) 
 
There is no state in the sense of an independently existing agent, 
empiricists argue. There is a long and respectable philosophical tradition behind 
this stance, going back to Hobbes and Locke, of regarding the states as a form 
of collective authority, an aggregation of individual wills that follow from 
individual delegations of authority in order to better pursue the interests of the 
many. But there are also thinkers of holist convictions, holding that social 
entities such as the state are ontologically substantive, and hence are irreducible 
to lower level entities – individuals or groups. Social constructivists typically 
belong to this camp.  
 
 
The constructivist insight 
 
Alexander Wendt is one of the main representatives of the social 
constructivist approach to international relations. Broadly defined, social 
constructivism is a philosophical framework assuming, from an ontological 
viewpoint, that there are entities (kinds, relations, and properties) which depend 
for their existence on human collective intentionality, and that these entities are 
produced by various social mechanisms relying on collective action. The 
constructivist contention with regard to international relations is that most 
entities characteristic of political theory and practice – such as “society,” 
“state,” “sovereignty.” etc. – are socially constructed; in other words, they are 
created and re-created through collective action, provided that the “boundary 
conditions” (social, political and economic circumstances) allow it. 
Sovereignty, for instance, is often claimed to be socially constructed. Thus, 
Thomas Bierstecker and Cynthia Weber state that 
 
Sovereignty provides the basis in international law for claims of state actions, and 
its violation is routinely invoked as a justification for the use of force in international 
relations. Sovereignty, therefore, is an inherently social concept. States‟ claims to 
sovereignty construct a social environment in which they can interact as an international 
society of states, while at the same time the mutual recognition of claims to sovereignty is 
an important element in the construction of states themselves. (1996: 1-2) 
 
We shall get back to sovereignty below, in an attempt to disambiguate the 
concept. For the remainder of this paper, the focus will be on the constructivist 
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contribution to understanding the identities and interests of state actors in 
international politics. Wendt sees the state as a genuinely existing entity with 
substantive ontological status. He deals at length with the inability of the 
instrumentalist thinking about state agency to reduce it to individual action 
without explanatory loss. It is not my main interest here to address the pros and 
cons of the notion that the state is a unitary actor. Yet I find very apt and useful 
the dimensions along which Wendt explains the concept of state and, implicitly, 
its identity and interests. There are five characteristics that Wendt singles out as 
definitional for the notion of state:  
 
(1) an institutional legal order,  
(2) an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized 
violence,  
(3) an organization with sovereignty,  
(4) a society, and  
(5) a territory. (Wendt 1999: 202) 
 
The notions of internal “institutional legal order”, “monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence”, “society”, and “territory” are sufficiently transparent 
for our purposes, although there are salient philosophical aspects to discuss 
about each of them. “Sovereignty” is much more in need of clarification. Wendt 
distinguishes between and internal and an external kind of sovereignty, where 
the former refers to “the state as the supreme locus of political authority in 
society”, and the latter to “the absence of any external authority higher than the 
state, like other states, international law, or a supranational Church” (1999: 207-
208). He sees external sovereignty as “relatively straightforward”, but recent 
research on the topic displays the potential source of confusion that the concept 
of sovereignty is in international relations theory.  
The best analysis of sovereignty belongs to Krasner (1999). He 
distinguishes four distinct meanings that have been ascribed to the term 
“sovereignty”.  
 
International legal sovereignty refers to the practices associated with mutual 
recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence. 
Westphalian sovereignty refers to political organization based on the exclusion of the 
external actors from authority structures within a given territory. Domestic sovereignty 
refers to the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of 
public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own policy. 
Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow 
of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state. 
(Krasner 1999: 3-4) 
 
Krasner admirably documents that these four sorts of sovereignty do not 
covary, meaning that “a state can have one but not the other” (1999: 4). For 
example, a state can have Westphalian sovereignty without having international 
4 
IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 29 
legal sovereignty – e.g. Taiwan. On the other hand, most states with 
international legal sovereignty do not enjoy the Westphalian kind, either 
because they concede to this by agreement, as in the case of the European 
Union members, or because they are under de facto domination of some foreign 
power. Also, numerous states have neither domestic, nor interdependence 
sovereignty; the so-called failed states of Africa are the most blatant instances.  
Krasner turns to March and Olsen‟s (1998) distinction between the logic 
of expected consequences and the logic of appropriateness to construct his 
theory of sovereignty:  
 
Logics of consequences see political action and outcomes, including institutions, 
as the product of rational calculating behavior designed to maximize a given set of unexplained 
preferences. Classical game theory and neoclassical economics are well-known examples. 
Logics of appropriateness understand political action as a product of rules, roles, and 
identities that stipulate appropriate behavior in given situations. (Krasner 1999: 5) 
 
Using this terminology, he frames the thesis that logics of consequences 
dominate the scene of international politics and that the institution of 
sovereignty is being hypocritically used in an instrumental sense, under the 
appearance of institutionally regulated behavior. He puts it bluntly in the slogan 
“Sovereignty is organized hypocrisy”. The domestic life of states is dominated 
by logics of appropriateness, for the domestic social and political system is 
strongly institutionalized and the roles of political actors are strongly regulated. 
However, the international environment, characterized by conflicts of interests, 
power asymmetries and the lack of an overriding authority offers the actors in 
particular situations the possibility to choose from different rules and follow 
those that best promote their interests. For example, the conflicting rules of 
nonintervention in another state‟s essential jurisdiction and humanitarian 
intervention are given course according to the instrumental interests of the 
decision-makers. 
Now, where do identity and self fit into the above analysis of the concept 
of state? It is easier to answer this by taking into account the following four 
aspects of identity distinguished by Wendt: personal/corporate (depending on 
whether it concerns particulars or corporate agents, respectively), type, role, and 
collective aspects. Let us take them one by one: 
(a) The personal/corporate identity refers to the distinctive material 
constitution of the entity. For states, corporate identity can be spelled out along 
the definitional characteristics delineated above, where sovereignty is to be 
taken in its internal sense.  
(b) Type identity “refers to a social category or „label‟ applied to persons 
[or entities] who share… some characteristics, in appearance, behavioral traits, 
attitudes, values, skills, knowledge, opinions, experience, historical commonalities, 
and so on” (Wendt 1999: 225). An actor – individual or corporate – can have 
5 
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multiple type identities simultaneously, as it can share various sets of values and 
opinions, and display different forms of behavior in relationship with different 
other actors. Through shared beliefs and values, type identity introduces a 
cultural element in the overall analysis of identity.  
(c) Role identities are cultural par excellence, as they designate the 
culturally conditioned roles that an actor plays in relation to the others. Roles 
are assigned relational predicates, such as “son”, “teacher”, “ruler” with respect 
to individuals, or “ally”, “enemy”, “hegemon” with regard to states. Each of 
them presupposes at least another object in order to apply validly. The 
“learning” of roles is a matter of the actors‟ collective knowledge of each 
other‟s beliefs and expectations. By acquiring such collective knowledge, each 
of the actors bound by relational predicates internalizes adequate behavior rules, 
which position them with respect to one another. Thus, the self reflects itself in 
the other and this reflection is assimilated in the actor‟s identity.  
(d) Finally, collective identity is reached though a cognitive process “in 
which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended 
altogether” (Wendt 1999: 229). Collective identity is the most salient aspect of 
Wendt‟s account of international relations. Unlike neorealism and 
neoliberalism, social constructivism observes the circumstances under which 
the boundaries of the self extend over, or are engulfed by, the other. Obviously, 
given the essential distinctiveness expressed in the personal/corporate aspect, 
identity cannot be collective in every respect, but only regarding some issue-
specific properties.  
Interests follow from the nature of identity, because what an actor wants 
depends on who an actor is. Ultimately, interests are motivational factors whose 
fulfillment contributes to the reproduction of their underlying identity. But we 
must distinguish between the actor‟s subjective perception and opinions of what 
its needs are, and the objective actions that must be taken in order to meet the 
actor‟s needs. Both kinds of interest have to be properly explained. Subjective 
interests are important because they are the proximate motivators of political 
actors. Statesmen, for instance, typically define and assess the national interest 
according to their information, values, and ideology. It is, therefore, salient to 
have a proper description of their subjective views on what the national interest 
is and how it is to be pursued. If political decision-makers constantly pursue a 
subjective national interest that diverges from the objective one, the identity 
underlying their political views will perish. But then how can one ever ascertain 
what the national interest really is? Is it something that only elites (political 
and/or epistemic) can grasp? Or it is simply what the majority of a society 
decides it is best for the most? Incidentally, the former can be true, yet the elites 
of undemocratic states can lack the legitimate means to pursue their objective 
interest. On the other hand, though democratically sanctioned ways of action are 
legitimate, majorities can be wrong or short-sighted (suboptimal).  
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It is relevant to delineate some salient aspects of the national interest. 
George and Keohane (1980) identify, from a neoliberal stance, three dimensions 
of the national interest: physical survival, autonomy, and economic well-being, 
to which Wendt adds a fourth one, “collective self-esteem” (1999: 235). 
Fundamentally, as realism teaches, the national interest concerns the survival of 
the society and its individual members. But our intuitions command other 
dimensions too, since it is not indifferent how the members of a state live. 
Autonomy refers to the ability of a state to retain exclusive control over the 
allocation of its resources and the choice of its government. It is a characteristic 
of the internal sovereignty of a state. Further on, economic well-being 
designates the material resource base of a state. The economic status is crucial 
not only for the possibility of survival, but also for its sovereignty and self-
esteem. Wendt aptly notices that “self-esteem is a basic human need of 
individuals, and one of the things that individuals seek in group membership” 
(1999: 236). Self-esteem is a psychological factor unmistakably influenced by 
culture, hence also by the relationship between the self and the other. These four 
dimensions of national interest may not be concomitantly achievable – in fact, 
they can even diverge. However, “In the long run all four must be satisfied. 
States that do not will tend to die out” (1999: 239). 
Summing up, the issue is not really whether states can act altruistically, 
that is, motivated by something else than self-interest. After all, with a 
contractarian mindset, any action, even the most generous one, can be explained 
as a matter of self-interest (Gauthier 1977). The genuine theoretical contribution 
of social constructivism is that the self can expand so as to merge, in certain 
significant respects, with the other, to the effect that altruism can be understood 
as the effect of a transformed self-interest. Once a particular group of states 
form a collective identity, self-interested action is actually perceived as cooperative.  
The European Union is the favorite source of evidence for social 
constructivism. The issue of constructing an European identity can be analyzed 
as a process of social groups progressively “learning” to identify with others in 
“concentric circles”, as Wendt put it. Nonetheless, I choose the following concluding 
example to show not only the theoretical resources of constructivism, but also 
some obvious limits of neoutilitarianism. In a controversial article published in 
the London Review of Books in March 2006, John Mearsheimer and Stephen 
Walt maintain that the amount of economic and military help that the US 
provides Israel in virtue of their privileged partnership defies the logic of self-
interest that Washington should follow according to the neorealist prescriptions. 
The authors list a series of measures of material support that the US has given 
Israel after World War II, which they deem disproportionate relative to both the 
benefits it brings Washington, and to the objective needs of Israel as an 
industrialized country. They identify the reason for this level of support in the 
domestic American politics, and particularly in the efficient “Israel Lobby”, 
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which, as they surmise, has managed to divert America‟s Middle East foreign 
policy from the American national interest. I shall not here review the pros and 
cons that have been expressed in the debate triggered by this paper.
3
 The point 
of bringing forward this particular case is to show that the neorealist conceptual 
framework, from within which Mearsheimer and Walt argue, makes difficult for 
them to see the possibility of an increasing perception of collective identity 
between Israel and the US, grounded in historical, cultural, moral, and 
civilization elements of identity. Consequently, there is a dominant perception 
of similarity of interests in both Americans and Israelis regarding many 
coordinates of their foreign policy, as well as an empathic understanding of 
each others‟ security fears. Up to a certain point, it is open to discussion 
whether Washington had more to gain in terms of security and economics from 
a more pro-Arab attitude in the Middle East. Yet no sophisticated foreign policy 
analysis can ignore actors‟ identities in accounting for the ways they act in order to 
achieve their interests. 
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